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Centralized Versus Decentralized Detection of
Attacks in Stochastic Interconnected Systems
Rajasekhar Anguluri, Vaibhav Katewa, and Fabio Pasqualetti
Abstract—We consider a security problem for interconnected
systems with linear, discrete, time-invariant, stochastic dynamics,
where the objective is to detect exogenous attacks by processing
measurements at different locations. We consider centralized and
decentralized detectors, which differ primarily in their knowledge
of the system model. In particular, a decentralized detector
has a model of the dynamics of the isolated subsystems, but
is unaware of the interconnection signals that are exchanged
among subsystems. Instead, a centralized detector has a model
of the entire dynamical system. We characterize the performance
of the two detectors and show that, depending on the system
and attack parameters, each of the detectors can outperform the
other. Hence, it may be possible for the decentralized detector
to outperform its centralized counterpart, despite having less
information about the system dynamics, and this property is due
to the nature of the considered attack detection problem (that
is, a simple vs composite hypothesis testing problem). Finally, we
numerically validate our findings on a power system model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems are becoming increasingly more
complex and interconnected. In fact, different cyber-physical
systems typically operate in a connected environment, where
the performance of each system is greatly affected by neigh-
boring units. An example is the smart grid, which arises
from the interconnection of smaller power systems at different
geographical locations, and whose performance depends on
other critical infrastructures including the transportation net-
work and the water system. Given the interconnected nature of
large cyber-physical systems, and the fact that each subsystem
usually has only partial knowledge or measurements of other
interconnected units, the security question arises as to whether
sophisticated attackers can hide their action to the individual
subsystems while inducing system-wide critical perturbations.
In this work we investigate whether, and to what extent,
coordination among different subsystems and knowledge of
the global system dynamics is necessary to detect attacks in
interconnected systems. In fact, while existing approaches for
the detection of faults and attacks typically rely on centralized
detectors [1], [2], the use of local detectors would not only be
computationally convenient, but also prevent the subsystems
from disclosing private information about their plants. As a
counterintuitive result, we will show that local and decentral-
ized detectors can, in some cases, outperform a centralized
detector, thus supporting the development of distributed and
localized tools for the security of cyber-physical systems.
This work was supported in part by awards ARO-71603NSYIP, NSF-
1405330, and UCOP-LFR-18-548175. The authors are with the Depart-
ment of Mechanical Engineering, University of California, Riverside,
{ranguluri,vkatewa,fabiopas}@engr.ucr.edu.
Related work: Centralized attack detectors have been the sub-
ject of extensive research in the last years [3]–[7], where the
detector has complete knowledge of the system dynamics and
all measurements. Furthermore, these studies use techniques
from various disciplines including game theory, information
theory, fault detection and signal processing, and have a
wide variety of applications [2]. Instead, decentralized attack
detectors, where each local detector decides on attacks based
on partial information and measurements about the system, and
local detectors cooperate to improve their detection capabili-
ties, have received only limited and recent attention [8]–[10].
Decentralized detection schemes have also been studied for
fault detection and isolation (FDI). In such schemes, multiple
local detectors make inferences about either the global or local
process, and transmit their local decisions to a central entity,
which uses appropriate fusion rules to make the global deci-
sion [11]–[14]. Methods to improve the detection performance
by exchanging information among the local detectors have also
been proposed [15], [16]. These decentralized algorithms are
typically complex [1], their effectiveness in detecting unknown
and unmeasurable attacks is difficult to characterize, and their
performance is believed to be inferior when compared to their
centralized counterparts. To the best of our knowledge, a
rigorous comparison of centralized and decentralized attack
detection schemes is still lacking, which prevents us from as-
sessing whether decentralized and distributed schemes should
be employed for attack detection and identification.
Main contributions:1 This paper features two main contribu-
tions. First, we propose particular centralized and decentral-
ized schemes to detect unknown and unmeasurable actuator
attacks in stochastic interconnected systems (Section III).
Our detection schemes are based on the statistical decision
theoretic framework that falls under the category of simple
versus composite hypotheses testing. We characterize the
probability of false alarm and the probability of detection
for both detectors, as a function of the system and attack
parameters. Second, we compare the performance of the
considered centralized and decentralized detectors, and show
that each detector can outperform the other for certain system
and attack configurations (Section IV). We discuss that this
phenomenon is inherent with the simple versus composite
nature of the considered attack detection problem, and provide
numerical examples of this behavior. Finally, we validate our
theoretical findings on the IEEE RTS-96 power system model.
1In a preliminary version of this paper [26], we used asymptotic approxima-
tions to compare the detectors’ performance. Instead, in this paper we provide
stronger, tight, and non-asymptotic results without using any approximation.
In addition, this paper includes an illustration of the results on a power grid.
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Mathematical notation: The following notation will be
adopted throughout the paper. Let X1, . . . , XN be arbitrary
sets, then
⋃N
i=1Xi and
⋂N
i=1Xi denotes the union and inter-
section of the sets, respectively. Trace(·), Rank(·), and Null(·)
denote the trace, rank, and null space of a matrix, respectively.
Q > 0 (Q ≥ 0) denotes that Q is a positive definite (positive
semi definite) matrix. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product for
matrices. blkdiag(A1, · · · , AN ) denotes the block diagonal
matrix with A1, · · · , AN as diagonal entries. The identity
matrix is denoted by I (or Idim to denote dimension explicitly).
Pr[E ] denotes the probability of the event E . The mean and
covariance of a random variable Y is denoted by E[Y ] and
Cov[Y ]. If Y follows a Gaussian distribution, we denote it
by Y ∼ N (E[Y ],Cov[Y ]). Instead, if Y follows a noncentral
chi-squared distribution, we denote it by Y ∼ χ2(p, λ), where
p is the degrees of freedom and λ is the non-centrality param-
eter. For Y ∼ χ2(p, λ), Q(τ ; p, λ) denotes the complementary
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Y , where τ ≥ 0.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
We consider an interconnected system with N subsystems,
where each subsystem obeys the discrete-time linear dynamics
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) + wi(k),
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k),
(1)
with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The vectors xi ∈ Rni and yi ∈ Rri
denote the state and measurements of the i-th subsystem,
respectively. The process noise wi(k) ∼ N (0,Σwi) and the
measurement noise vi(k) ∼ N (0,Σvi), with Σwi > 0 and
Σvi > 0, are independent stochastic processes, and wi is
assumed to be independent of vi, for all k ≥ 0. Further, the
noise vectors across different subsystems are assumed to be
independent at all times. The i-th subsystem is coupled with
the other subsystems through the term Biui, which reads as
Bi =
[
Ai1 · · · Ai,i−1 Ai,i+1 · · · AiN
]
, and
ui =
[
xT1 · · · xTi−1 xTi+1 · · · xTN
]T
.
The input Biui =
∑N
j 6=iAijxj represents the effect of all
subsystems on subsystem i. We refer to Bi and ui as to the in-
terconnection matrix and interconnection signal, respectively.
We allow for the presence of attacks compromising the
dynamics of the subsystems, and model such attacks as
exogenous unknown inputs. In particular, the dynamics of the
i-th subsystem under the attack uai with matrix B
a
i read as
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) +B
a
i u
a
i (k) + wi(k), (2)
where uai ∈ Rmi . Loosely speaking, the matrix Bai identifies
the states compromised by the attacker in the i-th subsystem,
while uai denotes the i-th attack strategy. In vector form, the
dynamics of the interconnected system under attack read as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k) + w(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k),
(3)
where x =
[
xT1 · · · xTN
] ∈ Rn, w ∈ Rn, ua ∈ Rm,
y ∈ Rr, v ∈ Rr, n = ∑Ni=1 ni, m = ∑Ni=1mi, and r =∑N
i ri. Moreover, as the components of the vectors w and v
are independent and Gaussian, it holds w ∼ N (0,Σw) and v ∼
N (0,Σv), respectively, where Σw = blkdiag (Σw1 , . . . ,ΣwN )
and Σv = blkdiag (Σv1 , . . . ,ΣvN ). Further,
A =
A11 · · · A1N... . . . ...
AN1 · · · ANN
 ,
C = blkdiag (C1, . . . , CN ) and C = blkdiag (C1, . . . , CN ).
We assume that each subsystem is equipped with a local
detector, which uses the local measurements and knowledge
of the local dynamics to detect the presence of local attacks.
In particular, the i-th local detector has access to the mea-
surements yi in (1), knows the matrices Aii, Bi, and Ci,
and the statistical properties of the noise vectors wi and vi.
Yet, the i-th local detector does not know or measure the
interconnection input ui, and the attack parameters Bai and
uai . Based on this information, the i-th local detector aims to
detect whether Bai u
a
i 6= 0. The decisions of the local detectors
are then processed by a decentralized detector, which aims to
detect the presence of attacks against the whole interconnected
system based on the local decisions. Finally, we assume the
presence of a centralized detector, which has access to the
measurements y in (3), and knows the matrix A and the
statistical properties of the overall noise vectors w and v.
Similarly to the local detectors, the centralized detector does
not know or measure the attack parameters Ba and ua, and
aims to detect whether Baua 6= 0. We postpone a detailed
description of our detectors to Section III. To conclude this
section, note that the decentralized and centralized detectors
have access to the same measurements. Yet, these detectors
differ in their knowledge of the system dynamics, which
determines their performance as explained in Section IV.
Remark 1: (Control input and initial state) Without loss of
generality, known control inputs have been omitted from (2)
and (3), because their effect can always be subtracted from
the measurements. Further, because the detectors do not have
any information about the initial state and attack signals, we
let these quantities be deterministic and unknown.
III. LOCAL, DECENTRALIZED, AND CENTRALIZED
DETECTORS
In this section we characterize the performance of our local,
decentralized, and centralized detectors as a function of the
available measurements and system knowledge. To this aim,
let T > 0 be an arbitrary time horizon and define the vectors
Yi =
[
yTi (1) y
T
i (2) · · · yTi (T )
]T
, (4)
the measurements available to detector i, and
Yc =
[
yT(1) yT(2) · · · yT(T )]T , (5)
which contains the measurements of the centralized detector.
Local and centralized detectors perform three operations:
1) collect measurements as in (4) and (5), respectively;
2) process the measurements to filter unknown variables;
3) perform statistical hypotheses testing to detect attacks
(locally or globally) using the processed measurements.
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The decisions of the local detectors are then used by the
decentralized detector, which triggers an alarm if any of the
local detectors does so. We next characterize how the detectors
process their measurements and perform attack detection.
A. Processing of measurements
The measurements (4) and (5) depend on parameters that
are unknown to the detectors, namely, the system initial state
and the interconnection signal (although the process and mea-
surement noises are also unknown, the detectors know their
statistical properties). Thus, to test for the presence of attacks,
the detectors first process the measurement to eliminate their
dependency on the unknown parameters. Using equations (1)
and (2), define the i-th observability matrix and the i-th attack,
interconnection, and noise forced response matrices as
Oi =
CiAii...
CiA
T
ii
 , Fai =
 CiB
a
i . . . 0
...
. . .
...
CiA
T−1
ii B
a
i . . . CiB
a
i
 ,
Fui =
 CiBi . . . 0... . . . ...
CiA
T−1
ii Bi . . . CiBi
 , Fwi =
 Ci . . . 0... . . . ...
CiA
T−1
ii . . . Ci
 .
Analogously, using (3), define the matrices Oc, Fwa , and Fwc
as above by replacing Ai, Bai , and Ci with A, B
a, and C,
respectively. The measurements (4) and (5) can be written as
Yi = Oixi(0) + Fui Ui + Fai Uai + Fwi Wi + Vi, (6)
Yc = Ocx(0) + Fac Ua + Fwc W + V, (7)
where Ui =
[
uTi (0) u
T
i (1) · · · uTi (T − 1)
]T
. The vectors
Uai , U
a, Wi, and W are the time aggregated signals of uai ,
ua, wi, and w, respectively, and are defined similarly to
Ui. Instead, Vi =
[
vTi (1) v
T
i (2) · · · vTi (T )
]T
, and V is
defined similarly to Vi. To eliminate the dependency from the
unknown variables, let Ni and Nc be bases of the left null
spaces of the matrices
[Oi Fui ] and Oc,2 respectively, and
define the processed measurements as
Y˜i = NiYi = Ni [Fai Uai + Fwi Wi + Vi] ,
Y˜c = NcYc = Nc [Fac Ua + Fwc W + V ] ,
(8)
where the expressions for Y˜i and Y˜c follows from (6) and
(7). Notice that, in the absence of attacks (Ua = 0), the
measurements Y˜i and Y˜c depend only on the system noise.
Instead, in the presence of attacks, such measurements also
depend on the attack vector, which may leave a signature for
the detectors. It should be noticed that Im(Bai ) ⊆ Im(Bi)
implies NiFai = 0. Thus, the processed measurements do not
depend on the attack, and our local detection technique cannot
be successful against attacks that satisfy this condition. We
2Throughout the paper, we assume that the matrices Ni and Nc are nonzero
and of full rank. In general, while Nc can be always made nonzero for a
sufficiently large horizon T , Ni depends on the number and location of the
interconnection signals and sensors. When Ni (resp. Nc) is zero, the detection
technique developed in the paper for the i-th subsystem cannot be successful.
now characterize the statistical properties of Y˜i and Y˜c (recall
that the attack is a deterministic and unknown vector).
Lemma 3.1: (Statistical properties of the processed mea-
surements) The processed measurements Y˜i and Y˜c satisfy
Y˜i ∼ N (βi,Σi) , and Y˜c ∼ N (βc,Σc) , (9)
where βi = NiFai Uai , βc = NcFac Ua, and
Σi = Ni
[
(Fwi ) (IT ⊗ Σwi) (Fwi )T + (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
Σc = Nc
[
(Fwc ) (IT ⊗ Σw) (Fwc )T + (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
NTc .
(10)
A proof of Lemma 3.1 is postponed to the Appendix. From
Lemma 3.1, the mean vectors βi and βc depend on the attack
vector, while the covariance matrices Σi and Σc, which are
invertible because Ni and Nc are assumed to be of full rank,
are independent of the attack. Hence, we develop a detection
mechanism based on the mean of the processed measurements.
B. Statistical hypothesis testing framework
In this section we detail our attack detection mechanism,
which we assume to be the same for all local and centralized
detectors, and we characterize its false alarm and detection
probabilities. We start by analyzing the test procedure of the
i-th local detector. Let H0 be the null hypothesis, where βi = 0
and the system is not under attack, and let H1 be the alternative
hypothesis, where βi 6= 0 and the system is under attack. To
decide which hypothesis is true or, equivalently, whether the
mean value of the processed measurements is zero, we resort
to the generalized log-likelihood ratio test (GLRT):
Λi , Y˜ Ti Σ−1i Y˜i
H1
≷
H0
τi, (11)
where the threshold τi ≥ 0 is selected based on the desired
false alarm probability of the test (11) [17]. For a statistical
hypothesis testing problem, the false alarm probability equals
the probability of deciding for H1 when H0 is true, while
the detection probability equals the probability of deciding
for H1 when H1 is true. While the former is used for
tuning the threshold, the latter is used for measuring the
performance of the test. Formally, the false alarm and detection
probabilities of (11) are given by PFi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H0] and
PDi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H1], respectively. Similarly, the centralized
detector test is defined as
Λc , Y˜ Tc Σ−1c Y˜c
H1
≷
H0
τc, (12)
where τc ≥ 0 is a preselected threshold, and its false alarm
and detection probabilities are denoted as PFc and P
D
c .
Lemma 3.2: (False alarm and detection probabilities of
local and centralized detectors) The false alarm and the de-
tection probabilities of the tests (11) and (12) are, respectively,
PFi = Q(τi; pi, 0), P
D
i = Q(τi; pi, λi), and
PFc = Q(τc; pc, 0), P
D
c = Q(τc; pc, λc),
(13)
where
pi = Rank(Σi), pc = Rank(Σc),
λi = (U
a
i )
TMi(U
a
i ), λc = (U
a)TMc(U
a), and
(14)
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Mi = (NiFai )T Σ−1i (NiFai ), Mc = (NcFac )T Σ−1c (NcFac ).
Lemma 3.2, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix,
allows us to compute the false alarm and detection prob-
abilities of the detectors using the decision thresholds, the
system parameters, and the attack vector. Moreover, for fixed
PFi and P
F
c , the detection thresholds are computed as τc =
Q−1(PFc ; pc, 0) and τi = Q
−1(PFi ; pi, 0), where Q
−1(·) is
the inverse of the complementary CDF of a central chi-squared
distribution. The parameters pi, pc and λi, λc in Lemma 3.2
are the degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters.
Remark 2: (System theoretic interpretation of the detection
probability parameters) The degrees of freedom and the non-
centrality parameters quantify the knowledge of the detectors
about the system dynamics and the energy of the attack signal
contained in the processed measurements.
(Degrees of freedom) The detection and false alarm probabil-
ities are increasing functions of pi, because the Q function in
(13) is an increasing function of pi. Thus, increasing pi by, for
instance, increasing the number of sensors or the horizon T ,
may not lead to an improvement of the detector performance.
(Non-centrality parameter) The non-centrality parameter mea-
sures the energy of the attack signal contained in the processed
measurements. In the literature of communication and signal
processing, the non-centrality parameter is often referred to
as signal to noise ratio (SNR) [17]. For fixed τi and pi,
the detection probability increases monotonically with λi, and
approaches the false alarm probability as λi tends to zero.
(Decision threshold) For fixed λi and pi, the detection and
false alarm probabilities decrease monotonically with the
threshold τi. This is due to the fact that the complementary
CDFs, which define the detection and false alarm probabilities,
are decreasing functions of τi. As we show later, because
of the contrasting behaviors of the detection and false alarm
probabilities with respect to all individual parameters, the
decentralized detector can outperform the centralized one.
We now state a result that provides a relation between the
degrees of freedom and the non-centrality parameters of the
local and centralized detectors. This result plays a central role
in comparing the performance of these detectors.
Lemma 3.3: (Degrees of freedom and non-centrality pa-
rameters) Let pi, pc and λi, λc be the degrees of freedom and
non-centrality parameters of the i-th and centralized detectors.
Then, pi ≤ pc and λi ≤ λc for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
A proof of Lemma 3.3 is postponed to the Appendix. In
loose words, given the interpretation of the degrees of freedom
and noncentrality parameters in Remark 2, Lemma 3.3 states
that a centralized detector has more knowledge about the
system dynamics (pi ≤ pc) and its measurements contain
a stronger attack signature (λi ≤ λc) than any of the i-th
local detector. Despite these properties, we will show that the
decentralized detector can outperform the centralized one.
IV. COMPARISON OF CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED
DETECTORS
In this section we characterize the detection probabilities
of the decentralized and centralized detectors, and we derive
sufficient conditions for each detector to outperform the other.
Recall that the decentralized detector triggers an alarm if any
of the local detectors detects an alarm. In other words,
PDd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H1] ,
PFd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H0] ,
(15)
where PFd and P
D
d denote the false alarm and detection
probabilities of the decentralized detector, respectively.
Lemma 4.1: (Performance of the decentralized detector)
The detection and false alarm probabilities in (15) satisfy
PDd =1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
and PFd =1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
. (16)
A proof of Lemma 4.1 is postponed to the Appendix. It can
be shown that, when PFi = P
F
j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, PFd
increases with PFi and N . To allow for a fair comparison of
the detectors, we assume that PFc = P
F
d . Consequently, for a
fixed PFc , the probabilities P
F
i satisfy P
F
c = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
.
Theorem 4.2: (Sufficient condition for PDc ≥ PDd ) Let
PFc = P
F
d , and let the following condition be satisfied:
τc ≤ pc + λc −
√
4N(pc + 2λc) ln (1− PDmax)−1, (17)
where PDmax = max{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then, PDc ≥ PDd .
A proof of Theorem 4.2 is postponed to the Appendix. We
next derive a sufficient condition for the opposite behavior.
Theorem 4.3: (Sufficient condition for PDd ≥ PDc ) Let
PFc = P
F
d , and let the following condition be satisfied:
τc ≥ pc + λc +
√
4 (pc + 2λc) ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N
)−1
+ 2 ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N
)−1
,
(18)
where PDmin = min{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then PDd ≥ PDc .
A proof of Theorem 4.2 is postponed to the Appendix.
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 provide sufficient conditions on the
detectors and attack parameters that result in one detector
outperforming the other. From (17) and (18) we note that,
depending on decision threshold τc, a centralized detector may
or may not outperform a decentralized detector. This can be
expected, as the Q function, which quantifies the detection
probability, is a decreasing function of τc (see Remark 2).
To clarify the effect of attack and detection parameters on
the detection performance, we express (17) and (18) using the
mean and standard deviation of the test statistic (12). Let µc ,
E [Λc] = λc + pc and σc , SD[Λc] =
√
2(pc + 2λc), where
the expectation and standard deviation (SD) of Λc follows
from the fact that under H1, Λc ∼ χ2(pc, λc) (see proof of
Lemma 3.2). Thus, (17) and (18) can be rewritten as
τc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln (1− PDmax)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κc
, and (19a)
τc ≥ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N
)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κd
+κ2d. (19b)
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Fig. 1: Probability density function of Λc under H1, as a function
of threshold τc. For τc = µc − κcσc and τc = µc + κdσd + σ2d, the
shaded area in panels (a) and (b) indicates the detection probability of
the centralized detector. As seen in panels (a) and (b), an increase in
κc results in larger area (larger detection probability) while a increase
in κd results in smaller area (smaller detection probability).
From (19a) and (19b) we note that a centralized detector out-
performs the decentralized one if τc is κc standard deviations
smaller than the mean µc. Instead, for a decentralized detector
to outperform the centralized detector, τc should be at least κd
standard deviations larger than the mean µc. See also Fig. 1.
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are illustrated in Fig. 2 as a function
of the non-centrality parameters. It can be observed that (i)
each of the detectors can outperform the other depending on
the values of the noncentrality parameter, (ii) the provided
bounds qualitatively capture the actual performance of the
centralized and decentralized detectors as the non-centrality
parameters increase, and (iii) the provided bounds are rather
tight over a large range of non-centrality parameters. It can
also be shown that the difference of the centralized and decen-
tralized detection probabilities can be large, especially when
the non-centrality parameters are small and satisfy λc ≈ λi.
Remark 3: (Detectors’ performance and lack of Uniformly
Most Powerful (UMP) test) The GLRT is likely not a UMP
test for our simple vs. composite attack detection problem and,
in fact, a UMP test likely does not exist in this case. To see
this, notice that a UMP test does not exist even when the attack
vector has length 1; see [17]. Due to the lack of a UMP test
for our attack detection problem, the decentralized detector
outperforms the centralized one in some cases, even though
the latter has more knowledge about the system. Finally, our
findings are specific to the considered detectors, and different
tradeoffs can be obtained for different detection schemes.
V. NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF CENTRALIZED AND
DECENTRALIZED DETECTORS
In this section, we demonstrate our theoretical findings
on the IEEE RTS-96 power network model [18], which we
partition into three subregions as shown in [19]. We followed
the approach in [19] to obtain a linear time-invariant model of
the power network, and then discretized it using a sampling
time of 0.01 seconds. For PFc = P
F
d = 0.05, we consider the
family of attacks Ua =
√
θ/(1TMc1)1, where 1 is the vector
of all ones and θ > 0. It can be shown that the noncentrality
parameters satisfy λc = θ and λi = θ(1TMi1)/(1TMc1) and,
moreover, the choice of vector 1 is arbitrary and it does not
affect the following results.
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Fig. 2: This figure shows when the decentralized, comprising
identical local detectors, and centralized detectors outperform their
counterpart, as a function of the non-centrality parameters. The
regions identified by solid markers correspond to the conditions in
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. Instead, regions identified by empty markers
are identified numerically. Since λi ≤ λc, the white region (top left)
is not admissible. For a fixed PFc = PFd = 0.01, (a) corresponds to
the case of N = 2 and (b) corresponds to the case of N = 4. When
N = 4, the decentralized detector outperforms the centralized one
for a larger set of noncentrality parameters.
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Fig. 3: Scenarios in which the centralized detector outperforms the
decentralized detector (a), and vice versa (b), on the IEEE RTS-96
power network, for a range of attack parameter (θ) values. In panels
(c) and (d) we plot the right (solid line) and left hand expressions
(dashed line) of the inequalities (19a) and (19b), respectively, as a
function of θ. For attacks such that the time horizon T = 100 sec and
θ > 200, the sufficient condition (19a) holds true, it guarantees that
PDc ≥ PDd . Instead, when T = 125 sec and θ < 500, the sufficient
condition (19a) holds true, it guarantees that PDc ≥ PDd .
(Illustration of Theorem 4.2) For the measurement horizon of
T = 100 seconds, the values of pc and τc are 5130 and 5480.6,
respectively. Fig. 3 show that the detection probabilities of the
centralized and decentralized detectors increase monotonically
with the attack parameter θ. As predicted by the sufficient
condition (19a) and shown in Fig. 3, the centralized detector is
guaranteed to outperform the decentralized detector when θ >
173. This figure also shows that our condition is conservative,
because PDc ≥ PDd for all values of θ as shown in Fig. 3.
(Illustration of Theorem 4.3) Contrary to the previous example,
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by letting T = 125 seconds, we obtain pc = 6755 and
τc = 6947.3. For these parameters, the decentralized detector
is guaranteed to outperform the centralized one when θ ≤ 511.
This behavior is predicted by our sufficient condition (19b),
and is illustrated in Fig. 3. The estimation provided by our
condition (19b) is conservative, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we compare the performance of GLRT based
centralized and decentralized schemes for the detection of
attacks in stochastic interconnected systems. In addition to
quantifying the performance of each detector, we prove the
counterintuitive result that the decentralized scheme can, at
times, outperform its centralized counterpart, and that this
behavior is due to the simple versus composite nature of the
attack detection problem. We remark that this result holds
for the proposed detectors. We illustrate our findings through
academic examples and a case study based on the IEEE RTS-
96 power system. Several questions remain of interest for
future investigation, including the characterization of optimal
detection schemes, an analytical comparison of the degradation
induced by undetectable attacks as a function of the detection
scheme, and the analysis of iterative detection strategies.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Since the vectors Uai and U
a are
deterministic, and Wi, Vi, V , and W are zero mean random
vectors, due to linearity, it follows from (8) that
βi , E[Y˜i] = NiFai Uai and βc , E[Y˜c] = NcFac Uac .
Further, from the properties of Cov[·], we have the following:
Σi , Cov
[
Y˜i
]
= NiCov [Yi]N
T
i
a
= Ni [Cov [Fwi Wi] + Cov[Vi]]NTi
b
= Ni
[
(Fwi ) Cov [Wi] (Fwi )T + Cov[Vi]
]
NTi
= Ni
[
(Fwi ) (IT ⊗ Σwi) (Fwi )T + (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
where (a) and (b) follows because the measurement and
process noises are i.i.d. Similar analysis also results in the
expression of Σc. Finally, Y˜i and Y˜c are Gaussian because they
are result of linear transformation of the Gaussian vectors.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: From the statistics and distributional form
of Y˜i and Y˜c (see (9)), and threshold tests defined in (11) and
(12), it follows from [20, Theorem 3.3.3] that:
1) under the hypothesis H0, Λi ∼ χ2(pi) and Λc ∼ χ2(pc),
where pi and pc are defined in (14).
2) under the hypothesis H1, Λi ∼ χ2(pi, λi) and Λc ∼
χ2(pc, λc), where λi = βTi Σ
−1
i βi and λc = β
T
c Σ
−1
c βc.
By substituting βi = NiFai Uai and βc = NcFac Uac (see
Lemma 3.1) and rearranging the terms, we get the expressions
of λi and λc in (14). Finally, from the distributional forms of
Λi and Λc, it now follows that the false alarm and the detection
probabilities of (11) and (12) are the right tail probabilities of
the central and noncentral chi-squared distributions, respec-
tively. Hence, the expressions in (13) follows.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3: Without loss of generality let i = 1.
Thus, it suffices to show that a) p1 ≤ pc and b) λ1 ≤ λc.
Case (a): Let
Σ˜i =
[
(Fwi ) (IT ⊗ Σwi) (Fwi )T + (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
> 0,
Σ˜c =
[
(Fwc ) (IT ⊗ Σw) (Fwc )T + (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
> 0.
(20)
From Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, and (20), we have pc = Rank(Σc) =
Rank
(
NcΣ˜
1/2
)
= Rank (Nc), and, p1 = Rank (N1). Since,
NT1 and N
T
c are a basis vectors of the null spaces NL1 and
NLc (see (31)) respectively, from Proposition A.1, p1 ≤ pc.
Case (b): Step 1 (alternative form of λ1 and λc): From (14),
λ1 and λc can be expressed as βT1 Σ
−1
1 β1 and β
T
c Σ
−1
c βc,
respectively, where β1, βc, Σ1, and Σc, that are obtained using
expressions in (8), are defined in Lemma 3.1. However, these
parameters can be obtained using permuted representation of
Yc (5). To see this, consider i-th sensor measurements of (3)
yc,i(k) = Cc,ix(k) + vi(k), (21)
where Cc,i =
[
0 · · · Ci · · · 0
]
. Let Yc,i =[
yTc,i(1) . . . y
T
c,i(T )
]T
. Then, from (21) and (3), we have
Yc,i = Oc,ix(0) + Fac,iUa + Fwc,iW + Vi, (22)
where Oc,i, Fac,i, and Fwc,i are similar to the matrices defined
in Section II-A. Finally, from (22), it follows thatYc,1...
Yc,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ŷc
=
Oc,1...
Oc,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ôc
x(0) +
F
a
c,1
...
Fac,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂ac
Ua +
F
w
c,1
...
Fwc,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂wc
W + V.
From the distributional assumptions on W and V , it fol-
lows that Ŷc ∼ N
(
Ôcx(0) + F̂ac Ua,Σ
)
, where Σ =(
F̂wc
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F̂wc
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv).
Now, consider the measurement equation in (1) and note
that Cc,ix(k) = Cixi(k). Thus, yi(k) = yc,i(k), for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and k ∈ N. Then, Yi = Yc,i = ΠiŶc for some
matrix Πi. Let N˜i = NiΠi and note that N˜iÔ = NiOc,i.
From Proposition A.1 and Lemma 3.1, NiOc,i = 0, and
βi , E[Yi] = ΠiE[Ŷc] = N˜iF̂ac Ua, and
Σi , Cov[Yi] = ΠiCov[Ŷc]ΠTi = N˜iΣN˜Ti .
(23)
Similarly, there exists a permutation matrix Q such that Yc =
QŶc, and, ultimately, Y˜c = NcYc = NcQŶc. Thus,
βc = NcQF̂ac Ua, and Σc = NcQΣ(NcQ)T. (24)
Let z = F̂ac Ua. From (23) and (24) we have
λ1 = z
TN˜T1
[
N˜1ΣN˜
T
1
]−1
N˜1, and
λc = z
T (NcQ)
T
[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
(NcQ) ,
(25)
which are the required alternative forms for λ1 and λc in (14).
Step 2 (lower bound on λc): Since Yc = NcYc = NcQŶc,
NcQ is the basis of the null space of Ôc. Further, the row vec-
tors of Oc,i and Oc,j are linearly independent whenever i 6= j.
Using these facts we can define Nc,i =
[
N1c,i · · · NNc,i
]
such that NcQ =
[
NTc,1 · · · NTc,N
]T
, where N ic,iOc,i = 0.
Let P1 =
[
(Nc,2)
T · · · (Nc,N )T
]T
and note that
[
Nc,1 P1
]
Σ
[
NTc,1 P
T
1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(NcQ)Σ(NcQ)
T
=
[
S1 Nc,1ΣP
T
1
NTc,1ΣP1 R
]
,
where S1 = Nc,1ΣNTc,1 and R = P
T
1 ΣP1. Since Σ > 0, S1
and R are invertible, and hence, there exists X ≥ 0 such that[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
=
[
S−11 0
0 0
]
+X. (26)
Let, Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
such that Σ11 > 0 and Σ22 > 0,
and define S2 = (N1c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T. By substituting Nc,1 =[
N1c,1 · · · NNc,1
]
in S1, by means of Schur’s complement,
it follows that
S−11 =
[
S−12 0
0 0
]
+ Y, (27)
where Y ≥ 0. Substituting(26) and (27) into (25), we have
λc = z
T(NcQ)
T
[
S−11 0
0 0
]
(NcQ)z + z
T(NcQ)
TX(NcQ)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ [(Nc,1z)T (P1z)T] [S−11 00 0
] [
Nc,1z
P1z
]
= zT(Nc,1)
T
[
S−12 0
0 0
]
(Nc,1)z + z
T(Nc,1)
TY (Nc,1)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ zT
[
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 0
0 0
]
z. (28)
Instead, λ1 in (25) can be shown to satisfy
λ1 = z
T
[
NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1 0
0 0
]
z, (29)
where we used the fact that N˜1 = N1Π1.
Step 3 (show λc ≥ λ1 using the lower bound (28)): To en-
sure the inequality λc ≥ λ1, from (28) and (29), it suffices to
show that (N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 ≥ NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1. From
Proposition A.1, we note that, there exists a full row rank
matrix F1 such that N1 = F1N1c,1. Since F
T
1 is a full column
rank matrix, define the invertible matrix F˜T1 ,
[
FT1 M
T
1
]
,
where M1 forms a basis of the null space of F1, such that
F˜T1
[
F˜1S2F˜
T
1
]−1
F˜1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S−12
= F˜T1
[
F1S2F
T
1 F1S2M
T
1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1
]−1
F˜1,
where the inverse term on the right hand side satisfies[
F1S2F
T
1 F1S2M
T
1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1
]−1
=
[(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
]
+ Z︸︷︷︸
≥0
.
By the above identities, it follows that
S−12 = F˜
T
1
[(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
]
F˜1 + F˜
T
1 ZF˜1. (30)
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Let Z1 , (F˜1N1c,1)TZ(F˜1N1c,1) ≥ 0, and now consider
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1
(31)
= (F˜1N
1
c,1)
T
[(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
]
F˜1N
1
c,1+Z1
a
=(F1N
1
c,1)
T
(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
F1N
1
c,1 + Z1
b
=NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1 + Z1
where (a) follows because F˜T1 = [F
T
1 M
T
1 ], and (b) by substi-
tuting S2 = (N1c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T and N1 = F1N1c,1. Since, Z1 ≥
0, it follows that (N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 > N
T
1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1,
which implies that λc ≥ λ1, as required.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let Ei be an event that the i-th local
detector decides H1 when H0 is true. Then, PFi = Pr [Ei] .
Let E{i be the complement of Ei. Then, from (15) we have
PFd = Pr
(
N⋃
i=i
Ei
)
= 1− Pr
(
N⋂
i=i
E{i
)
(a)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
E{i
)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− Pr (Ei)) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
,
where (a) follows because Ei’s are mutually independent for
all i ∈ {1, . . . N}. To see this fact, notice that Ei depends
only on Y˜i (see (8)). Further, Y˜i depends on the non-random
attack Uai and the noise vectors Vi and Wi, but not on the
interconnection signal Ui (see (6)). Since, Vi and Wi across
subsystems are independent, Ei are also mutually independent.
Similar procedure will lead to the expression for PDd .
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let µc = pc + λc and σc =√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume that (17) holds true. Then,
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln (1− PDmax)−1
]
.
Since Λc ∼ χ2(λc, pc), from the inequality (34b), we have
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ exp
(
−N ln (1− PDmax)−1)
= exp
(
ln
(
1− PDmax
)N) ≤ N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
,
where we used the fact that PDi ≤ PDmax for all i. By using
the above inequality and Lemma 3.2, under hypothesis H1,
PDc = 1− Pr [Λc ≤ τc|H1] ≥ 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= PDd .
Proof of Theorem 4.3 Let µc = pc + λc and σc =√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume that (18) holds true. Then,
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≥ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N
)−1
+ 2 ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N
)−1]
.
Since Λc ∼ χ2(λc, pc), from the inequality (34a) we have
1− PDc =Pr [Λc ≤ τc]≥1− exp
(
− ln (1− (1− PDmin)N)−1)
≥
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= 1− PDd .
Proposition A.1: Let Oi Fui be the observability and im-
pulse response matrices defined in (6). Define
NLi =
{
z : zT
[Oi Fui ] = 0} , and
NLc,i =
{
z : zTOc,i = 0
}
,
(31)
where Oc,i =
[
(Cc,iA)
T · · · (Cc,iAT )T]T and Cc,i =[
0 · · · Ci · · · 0
]
. Then, NLi ⊆ NLc,i ⊆ NLc , for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, where NLc =
⋃N
i=1NLc,i.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By definition,
the inclusion NLc,1 ⊆ NLc is trivial. For the other inclusion,
consider an auxiliary system x(k + 1) = Ax(k). Let x(k) =[
xT1 (k) u
T
1 (k)
]T
, where x1(k) and u1(k) are the state and
the interconnection signal of subsystem 1. Also, let
A =
[
A11 B1
B˜1 A˜11
]
. (32)
Then, the state x(k + 1) is decomposed into x1(k + 1) =
A11x1(k) +B1u1(k) and u1(k + 1) = A˜11u1(k) + B˜1x1(k).
By letting C˜1 =
[
C1A11 C1B1
]
it follows that
Cc,1A
kx(0) =
[
C1 0
]
AAk−1x(0) = C˜1
[
x1(k − 1)
u1(k − 1)
]
= C1A
k
11x1(0) +
k−1∑
j=0
C1A
k−1−j
11 B1u1(j), (33)
where the second, third, and fourth equality follows from (32),
system x(k + 1) = Ax(k), and the decomposition equations,
respectively. By invoking definition of Oc,1 in (33), we have
Oc,1x(0) = O1x1(0) + Fu1
[
uT1 (0) · · · uT1 (T − 1)
]T
.
Let z be any vector such that zT
[O1 Fu1 ] = 0T. Then, z
also satisfies zTOc,1 = 0T, which implies NL1 ⊆ NLc,1.
Lemma A.2: (Upper bound on PDd ) Let pi and λi
be defined as in (14), and τi be defined as in (11). Let
psum =
∑N
i=1 pi, λsum =
∑N
i=1 λi, and τmin = min1≤i≤N
τi. Then,
PDd ≤ Pr [Sd > τmin], where Sd ∼ χ2(psum, λsum).
Proof: Consider the events Vi =
{
Y˜ Ti Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τi
}
, for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and V =
{∑N
i=1 Y˜
T
i Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τmin
}
.
The event Vi is associated with the i-th local detector’s
threshold test. By observing that
⋃N
i=1 Vi ⊆ V , the inequality
PDd , Pr
[⋃N
i=1 Vi |H1
]
≤ Pr [V |H1] is obvious. Now, from
the reproducibility property of the non central chi-squared
distribution [21], it now follows that
∑N
i=1 Y˜
T
i Σ
−1
i Y˜i equals
Sd in distribution and hence, Pr[V|H1] = Pr[Sd > τmin].
Lemma A.3: (Tight bounds on the tails of χ2(p, λ)) Let
Y ∼ χ2(p, λ), µ = p+ λ, σ = √2(p+ 2λ). For all x > 0,
Pr
[
Y ≥ µ+ σ
√
2x+ 2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (34a)
Pr
[
Y ≤ µ− σ
√
2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (34b)
Proof: See [22].
